Blog No. 205. The Afghanistan Dilemma

Afghan women line up to cast their votes during a parliamentary election at a polling station in Kabul, Afghanistan, Oct. 21, 2018. www.voanews.com

On Monday, the Taliban attacked an intelligence base in Afghanistan, killing dozens. Afghan officials said that it was one of the deadliest attacks against the intelligence service in the 17-year war with the Taliban. It was also a dramatic reminder, if any were needed, of the perilous conditions in that country. Prior to the attack, Afghanistan had come into the news when President Trump blocked a trip to the country by Speaker Nancy Pelosi and other lawmakers, dismissing the trip as a “public relations event.” It is clear, however, that there were important reasons for the trip by the Congressional delegation that Pelosi would have led. The current state of the conflict in Afghanistan is deeply disturbing and American policy in the country may be yet again at a crossroads.

The situation in Afghanistan has been described by Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, as a “slowly deteriorating stalemate.” As Haass has pointed out:

The government controls territory where an estimated two-thirds of the population lives. But the Taliban and even more radical groups, including those associated with AL-Qaeda and the Islamic State, control or contest nearly half the territory and have repeatedly demonstrated an ability to attack military and civilian targets alike anywhere and everywhere inside the country, including the capital, Kabul.

American plans for our continued engagement in Afghanistan appear to be in flux. In 2017, Secretary of Defense James Mattis had persuaded President Trump to increase the troop level in Afghanistan by 4,000, and in early December of last year, Mattis had indicated that American troop levels would be maintained at their current level. A few weeks later, however, Mattis resigned and the following day, the New York Times reported that Trump had not only ordered the withdrawal of troops from Syria but had directed the Pentagon to prepare plans to reduce American troops in Afghanistan from 14,000 to 7,000. According to the Washington Post, Trump’s directive on Afghanistan as well as his Syrian order, triggered the Mattis resignation.

In addition to American troops, approximately 8,000 troops from 38 countries are a part of NATO’s Resolute Support Mission who are engaged in training and advising Afghan security forces under the command of Lt. General Austin “Scott” Miller. It is entirely unclear what consultation there has been with our allies (or General Miller) concerning a reduction of U. S. forces or what effect such a reduction would have on troop contributions from other nations.

Since Mattis’s departure, confusion has surrounded our policy in both Syria and Afghanistan. While the order of withdrawal from Syria has not changed, the timing apparently has become more flexible, and National Security Adviser John Bolton has made statements suggesting conditions to the withdrawal that could delay it indefinitely. In the case of Afghanistan, a spokesman for the National Security Council wrote in a December 28 email “The president has not made a determination to drawdown US military presence in Afghanistan and he has not directed the Department of Defense to begin the process of withdrawing US personnel from Afghanistan.”

When Trump’s Afghanistan decision was first reported, Senator Lindsey Graham, a key Trump supporter, said that the force reduction would be “paving the way toward a second 9/11.” A month later, during a trip to Islamabad, Graham was asked about the reduction, and replied “I’ve had no evidence that there’s been a number like that at all. I don’t believe that report’s accurate.” Apart from Graham, however, neither Republicans nor Democrats on Capitol Hill have had much to say about a partial withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the few Democratic presidential candidates to comment have limited themselves to saying that they favored withdrawal, but “not the way Trump is doing it.” For his part, Trump has made no attempt to clarify his intentions by tweet or otherwise.

A desire to withdraw from Afghanistan, partially or entirely, is understandable. We appear to have relatively little to show for our investment of blood and treasure. More than 2,000 American soldiers have lost their lives in Afghanistan, and another 20,000 have been wounded, many severely. The war has cost well over $1 trillion and is budgeted at approximately $45 Billion for the current year. And yet, withdrawing partially or entirely is probably not the answer.

It has been clear for sometime that the United States has given up any idea of “winning” in Afghanistan and the thrust of American policy has been to seek some sort of negotiated political settlement. Zalmay Khalilzad, the American special envoy for facilitating Afghan peace talks, has made repeated trips to the region over the past couple of months attempting to build momentum for settlement talks and trying to sound optimistic. When the New York Times reported the most recent attack by the Taliban, the same story also reported a statement by the Taliban saying that they had resumed stalled talks, with American diplomats in Doha, the capital of Qatar:

Following American acceptance of the agenda of ending invasion of Afghanistan and preventing Afghanistan from being used against other countries in the future, talks with American representatives took place today in Doha.

There is reason to question whether any settlement negotiations can be successful. Given the strength of the Taliban on the ground, they have little reason to make concessions to the United States or the Afghan government. Moreover, if the proposed reduction in the American military presence is implemented, it can only embolden the Taliban to wait further, anticipating a complete withdrawal. It is very difficult to understand why Trump would undermine his own negotiating position in such a significant way, and even the fact that such an action is reportedly under consideration is harmful.

In view of our emphasis on reaching a settlement, it is remarkable that very little has been done to define, at least publicly, what a settlement with the Taliban might look like and whether a new government produced by settlement would protect the interests of the United Stated or the human rights of Afghan people. If the Taliban became a major element of the government, it is not hard to imagine that, with their demonstrated discipline and motivation, they might soon become dominant. If so, what then? The war in Afghanistan began seventeen years ago when the attacks on 9/11 were initiated by Al Qaeda operating from that country, and both Al Qaeda and ISIS are present there today. What guarantees would we have that under a Taliban government Al Qaeda, ISIS, or some new radical group, would not be allowed to establish bases from which to organize new attacks.

A Taliban government in Afghanistan could also be expected to reprise the harsh treatment of its own people, especially women and children, that it displayed when previously in power. A recent report from the Voice of America is titled “A Taliban Talks Progress, Afghan Women Fear Turning Back Clock.” The report described the progress made since 2001 despite the ongoing war, and recalled facts of life under Taliban rule: education of children was limited, and women were banned from work, required to wear the full-length burqa that covered their faces, and not allowed to leave the house without a male relative. Even more disturbing were the conditions reported by Amnesty International:

Rape and violence against women and girls was rife. Afghan women were brutalised in the law and in nearly every aspect of their daily life. A woman in Kabul had the end of her thumb cut off for wearing nail varnish, for example, in 1996.

Another woman described the murder of her father:

“They shot my father right in front of me. It was nine o’clock at night. They came to our house and told him they had orders to kill him because he allowed me to go to school. The Mujahideen had already stopped me from going to school, but that was not enough. I cannot describe what they did to me after killing my father…”

We would not have gone to war to protect the human rights of Afghan women and children and few would argue that we should continue in one for that purpose. Nevertheless, if the Taliban once again rule and resume their brutal ways, the abuse of Afghan women and children will be collateral damage of kind that will be painfully difficult to ignore.

The Taliban are hardly invincible—in the months following 9/11 we routed them militarily. But when we diverted troops to Iraq, the Taliban survived, and today they are far better organized and far better equipped. At the same time, we and our NATO allies have given the Afghan security forces the responsibility for their own defense and that decision is plainly irreversible. Neither the President, nor Congress, nor the public at large would have any stomach for re-introducing a large military force into Afghanistan. On the other hand, the continuation of a modest but significant military force seems essential if the stalemate is not to deteriorate further and if the Afghan security force is not to collapse, bringing the government down with it. How large must our forces in Afghanistan be? It would be reassuring to think that any proposed reduction reflected a careful analysis by the Pentagon and the senior American commander in Afghanistan, General Miller. That, however is not the way of our impulsive President, and it is therefore important for Congress to add Afghanistan to the list of matters urgently requiring oversight.