Blog No. 178. The North Korea Summit: High Stakes or Low Stakes?

The atmosphere between the United States and North Korea has improved remarkably since the time not long ago when North Korea was testing long-range missiles and Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un were exchanging fiery insults. Credit must be given to the leaders for their embrace of civility and to the United States for leading the way to multi-national sanctions that got Kim’s attention in a serious way. Some credit must also be given to South Korea’s President, Moon Jae-in, who has played a pro-active and constructive role. Nevertheless, the road ahead is marked by uncertainty and peril.

In an April 24 Wall Street Journal column, Walter Russell Mead, suggested that the meeting between Trump and Kim would be a “low stakes summit” that would result in a framing of issues rather than resolving them. He envisioned an outcome along the following lines:

North Korea would accept denuclearization as a goal and suspend nuclear testing; the U.S. would agree to lift some sanctions and support negotiations about peace. The key will be the missile program; if Mr. Kim agrees to freeze it in place, Trump can claim a win, peace talks can proceed, and everyone can make pious speeches about denuclearization.

Mead acknowledged that such a result would amount to kicking the can down the road, but argued that “sometimes kicking is all you can do.” Indeed, but it is not at all clear that even that limited agreement is achievable. While North Korea might be amenable to such an arrangement, it is very far from clear that the United States, and particularly its president, would accept anything of the sort. Mead’s modest scenario may prove to be overly optimistic, and that is where the peril comes in.

Mead’s analysis echoed points made by many other foreign policy experts. Foremost is the belief that Kim is unlikely ever to carry out what the United States, seeks: “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization,” sometimes referred to by the acronym, CVID. Mead and others believe that possession of nuclear weapons is fundamental not only to the Kim regime’s sense of security, but to its entire economic and political strategy. Moreover, Kim is well aware of regimes, such as Libya and Ukraine which gave up nuclear weapons to their considerable cost. In short, while Kim may be willing to talk of denuclearization, or even promise it, actual achievement of CVID may be quite something else.

Recognizing that fact, the United States may demand that denuclearization precede sanctions relief. A news article in the same edition of the Journal as Mead’s essay reported that:

When the president says that he will not make the mistakes of the past, that means the U.S. will not be making substantial concessions, such as lifting sanctions, until North Korea has substantially dismantled its nuclear programs,” a senior Trump administration official said on Sunday.

That might do for an opening position, but if adhered to, it could produce a rather short meeting. The question that the administration must ask itself is why, even if Kim were amenable to CVID,  should he trust the United States sufficiently to proceed in that fashion? It seems more likely that North Korea will proceed with disabling or dismantling its nuclear program, if at all, only on a phased basis whereby its actions are matched by reciprocal sanctions relief. Moreover, if a genuine CVID is achievable, it will likely come at a price that involves considerably more than sanctions relief. Among the possibilities are conclusion of a peace treaty with the United States as well as South Korea, and limiting United State military presence in South Korea.

What then, if Trump finds that North Korea is not prepared to denuclearize to the extent, or at the pace, he demands? Trump recently commented that “If the meeting, when I’m there, is not fruitful, I will respectfully leave the meeting.” It is precisely such a possibility, and what might ensue from it, that makes the meeting a high stakes summit indeed. As arms control expert Jeffrey Lewis worried in March:

What if Trump, having deluded himself into thinking he’s going to pick up Kim Jong Un’s bombs, suddenly decides that he’s been double-crossed? He could use the summit outcome to discredit diplomacy and open the pathway toward war.

The dangers inherent in an unsuccessful summit may have grown with Trump’s sudden and peculiar expressions of personal warmth toward Kim, now describing the onetime “little rocket man” as “very open, very honorable.” Setting aside the question of whether Kim deserves such a compliment, the risk is that in Trump’s eyes any disappointment is more likely to be regarded as a betrayal by his new “friend.” In that event, the consequences may be grave.

A premise of Mead’s Wall Street Journal essay was that from the American perspective, war with North Korea is virtually unthinkable:

Besides the 28,500 troops, there are more than 200,000 American civilians in South Korea on any given day. The first day of hostilities in a new Korean War could see tens of thousands of U.S. civilian casualties with more to come. The total cost of such a war in treasure and in blood is both incalculable and unacceptable.

The cost of a war with North Korea is surely incalculable, but while that cost may seem unacceptable to many observers, including many military and civilian experts, it may not be unacceptable to the President and his more hawkish advisers, Secretary of State nominee, Michael Pompeo and National Security Adviser, John Bolton. The best hope for a moderating voice might have to come, ironically enough, from Defense Secretary, General James Mattis. As a Newsweek article on February 14 asked, “Can James Mattis Prevent Nuclear War With North Korea?”

On Capitol Hill, the leading hawk may be Senator Lindsey Graham who has appeared to view the prospect of war on the Korean Peninsula with chilling equanimity:

All the damage that would come from a war would be worth it in terms of long-term stability and national security. I’m completely convinced that President Trump and his team reject the policy of containment… They’ve drawn a red line here and it is to never let North Korea build a nuclear-tipped missile to hit America.

Graham’s view may not be held by a majority in Congress, but we may never know until, perhaps, it is too late. While legislation has been introduced in both houses that would constrain the president from making a preemptive strike, it seems unlikely ever to come to a vote.

The recent experience of the air and missile strike on Syria is not encouraging. As Jack Goldsmith and Oona Hathaway explained in some detail in Lawfare, that action rested on highly questionable legal grounds, under both international and domestic law. Nevertheless, the strike drew only desultory objections in Congress and the media. Admittedly, there were grounds in that unique case for not being overly upset. The attack was a response to proven use of a banned substance and an action in which we were joined by allies. The limited strike destroyed the intended targets without civilian casualties and drew no reprisal from Syria or Russia. An attack on North Korea, however, would be a very different matter, and it is troubling that the recent raid on Syria, as well as the previous strike, may come to be regarded as precedents.

While Secretary Mattis is a relative moderate in the Trump war cabinet, his view of presidential authority, as expressed in connection with the Syrian raid, is expansive:

As our commander in chief, the president has the authority under Article II of the Constitution to use military force overseas to defend important U.S. national interests.  The United States has an important national interest in averting a worsening catastrophe in Syria, and specifically deterring the use and proliferation of chemical weapons.

As Goldsmith and Hathaway pointed out, this constitutional rationale would permit the president “to use air power unilaterally basically whenever he sees fit.” It does not take a large stretch of the imagination to envision such an argument being made with respect to a preemptive attack on North Korea.

On Tuesday, the risks of unchecked presidential power were exposed in the context of yet another international challenge. Trump was asked about Iran and the indication that, if Trump withdrew the United States from the multinational agreement, Iran would resume its nuclear program. Trump replied that “They’re not going to be restarting anything. They restart it they’re going to have big problems, bigger than they’ve ever had before.” Trump did not define “big problems,” but since his nominee for Secretary of State and his National Security Adviser have previously suggested military action against Iran, that option has to be considered a lively possibility. Moreover, it is no doubt something that Trump would feel free to undertake without Congressional authorization.

Various observers have suggested that Democrats are somewhat adrift in trying to settle on a theme or themes for the fall election. One possibility that they might consider is running on a promise to have Congress reclaim its constitutional responsibility to declare war.